From Space to Power: The New Geopolitics of Orbits

Main Topics

• Understanding Space Power
• Starlink and the Transformation of Modern Warfare
• Cybersecurity as a Pillar of Space Power
• The Strategic Role of Modern Space Architectures

A New Geo-Political Paradigm

For more than six decades, outer space has been viewed primarily as a domain of scientific exploration, technological competition, and national prestige. Today, however, this traditional understanding is becoming increasingly inadequate. Earth orbit has evolved into an essential component of contemporary strategic power projection, to the point that the security of advanced societies depends ever more heavily on infrastructures deployed in space. Major geopolitical transformations rarely begin with official declarations. More often, they emerge through seemingly isolated events that reveal structural changes already underway. The investigation published by The Insider and subsequently reported by Der Spiegel and Le Monde belongs to this category. Rather than merely exposing an alleged anti-satellite programme, it reveals a far more significant development: the changing nature of power in the twenty-first century. According to the documents obtained by the three newspapers, Moscow and Beijing are reportedly developing a multilayered strategy aimed at the SpaceX constellation, combining diplomatic initiatives, competition over radio frequencies and orbital slots, electronic warfare, cyber operations, and, as a measure of last resort, anti-satellite capabilities. Their objective is not simply to destroy individual satellites, but to undermine the resilience of the Starlink ecosystem as a whole. Yet this is not the most important aspect of the story. Starlink is merely the most visible case study of a much broader transformation. Competition among the major powers is no longer centred solely on the control of territory, maritime routes, or military bases. Increasingly, it concerns the ability to secure the networks that enable the modern state to function. In this context, outer space has become the enabling infrastructure that underpins the principal strategic functions of the state, making it possible to speak of Space Power not simply as the possession of space capabilities, but as the capacity to leverage orbital infrastructures as multipliers of economic, military, technological, and political power.

Starlink and the Ukrainian Case

Today, this perspective has been fundamentally reversed. Communications, satellite navigation, Earth observation, the synchronization of financial networks, the management of energy infrastructure, intelligence, autonomous systems, and military command increasingly rely on assets deployed in orbit. Earth orbit is no longer merely an operational domain; it has become the enabling infrastructure upon which all other domains increasingly depend. From this perspective, the war in Ukraine represents one of the first conflicts in which a commercial satellite constellation has assumed a strategic role comparable to that of a conventional state military capability. Throughout the conflict, Starlink ensured the continuity of government communications, supported the coordination of tactical operations, enabled drone employment, facilitated the transmission of intelligence, and preserved the resilience of Ukraine’s communications network even during the most critical phases of the Russian invasion. Yet Starlink is not, in itself, the real story. Rather, it has become the clearest manifestation of a much broader transformation: the emergence of Space Power as a new dimension of geopolitical influence. That a satellite constellation employed in an ongoing conflict should be regarded as a strategic target is almost inevitable. What is genuinely unprecedented is that a commercially operated satellite network is now perceived as one of the international system’s most consequential strategic assets.

Governing the Orbits: A New Form of Strategic Influence

To appreciate the significance of this transformation, it must be situated within the broader theoretical debate on Space Power. As early as 2002, Everett Carl Dolman, in his now-classic Astropolitik, advanced an argument whose relevance has only grown with time:

“Who controls the low orbit, de facto controls the space around Earth. Who controls the space around Earth controls the planet. Who controls the planet, determines the destiny of humankind.”

When Dolman formulated this theory, low Earth orbit hosted only a few hundred satellites. Today, by contrast, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) has become the planet’s digital infrastructure. Constellations such as Starlink, OneWeb, Kuiper, Guowang, and, in the near future, IRIS² do far more than transmit data: they sustain government communications, the digital economy, Earth observation, financial services, navigation, and military operations.In this respect, low Earth orbits are assuming a role comparable to that played by the world’s sea lanes during the era of British naval supremacy. If Alfred Thayer Mahan identified the oceans as the principal geopolitical arena of international competition in the nineteenth century, Dolman effectively transposes that same strategic paradigm into low Earth orbit. LEO thus becomes the new “sea” of the twenty-first century: a domain through which information, communications, data, military capabilities, and essential services continuously flow. Unlike the analogy often invoked in debates over the legal status of celestial bodies, where comparison with the law of the sea can be misleading, the parallel is particularly compelling when applied to orbital infrastructure and the strategic functions it performs. It is within these orbital bands that the world’s largest constellations for telecommunications, Earth observation, navigation, and dual-use services are concentrated. Their relatively low altitude provides reduced latency, high transmission capacity, and near-global coverage, making them indispensable for both civilian and military applications. It is therefore no coincidence that the overwhelming majority of operational satellites are now deployed in this region of space. The war in Ukraine has provided compelling empirical confirmation of what Dolman had anticipated in theoretical terms: those who control orbital networks do not merely control space itself, but the flows of information, communication, and command upon which the exercise of power on Earth increasingly depends. As Bleddyn Bowen argues, Space Power lies not in dominating outer space for its own sake, but in the ability to employ space infrastructures to generate political and strategic effects on Earth. In other words, the strategic value of space resides less in the control of orbit than in the influence that space capabilities exert across every other operational domain. The investigation into Starlink demonstrates that this transformation no longer belongs to the realm of theory. It has become a tangible feature of strategic competition among the major powers, giving rise to an increasingly multipolar space ecosystem in which success depends not simply on the number of satellites or launch capabilities, but on the capacity to develop autonomous, resilient, and integrated orbital architectures.

Space Cyberwarfare and Fifth-Generation Warfare

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the investigation lies in the nature of the capabilities that Russia and China appear to be developing. According to the leaked documents, their strategy does not prioritize the physical destruction of satellites. Instead, it seeks to compromise the entire architecture supporting the constellation through a combination of diplomatic pressure, competition over orbital resources, electronic warfare, spoofing, jamming, cyber operations, and, only as a measure of last resort, anti-satellite weapons. This approach closely reflects the evolution of what has come to be known as fifth-generation warfare. As early as the late 1990s, Chinese People’s Liberation Army Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui argued in Unrestricted Warfare that the conflicts of the twenty-first century would no longer be fought exclusively with tanks, missiles, and naval fleets. Instead, strategic competition would increasingly revolve around the ability to disrupt an adversary’s systemic functioning through economic, technological, informational, cognitive, and cyber instruments. From this perspective, the objective of fifth-generation warfare is not necessarily the conquest of territory. Rather, it is to paralyse the networks upon which the modern state depends, progressively degrading its capacity to make decisions and conduct operations. It is within this conceptual framework that the notion of Space Cyberwarfare emerges. Modern space architectures consist of far more than satellites in orbit. They encompass ground segments, control stations, data centres, cloud infrastructures, mission software, user terminals, radio links, command-and-control systems, and distributed digital networks. Outer space and cyberspace have therefore become inseparable operational domains. What is emerging is no longer a conflict between individual satellites, but one between competing orbital ecosystems. Strategic superiority no longer depends on the possession of a single space asset. Instead, it derives from the ability to integrate satellites, ground infrastructure, cloud computing, software, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, and cybersecurity into a single resilient architecture. Consequently, disrupting a constellation does not necessarily require destroying satellites in orbit. Its effectiveness can be degraded through cyber operations, electronic warfare, spoofing, jamming, or attacks against the terrestrial segment. The vulnerability of space systems is therefore no longer merely physical; it is increasingly digital. Within this evolving environment, a new form of orbital deterrence is beginning to take shape, in which the ability to disrupt satellite constellations, GNSS services, or space-enabled communications becomes a strategic instrument of coercion in its own right. The war in Ukraine has become the first large-scale laboratory for this emerging model of conflict. In the hours immediately preceding the February 2022 invasion, Russia launched a coordinated offensive against Ukraine’s satellite and digital infrastructure, targeting the Viasat network through a cyberattack while simultaneously degrading GPS signals across the operational theatre. The objective was not to destroy satellites physically, but to interrupt communications, degrade command and control, and reduce the situational awareness of Ukrainian forces. The subsequent deployment of Starlink demonstrated how a commercial satellite constellation could rapidly restore these critical capabilities, materially altering the operational balance on the battlefield. The investigation by The Insider suggests that this growing integration between cyber and space operations is now extending to the development of both space and counter-space capabilities, further indicating that Sino-Russian cooperation is evolving into an increasingly structured and enduring strategic partnership.

The Unseen Infrastructures of Power

What makes this transformation particularly significant is the growing interdependence between space-based networks and critical terrestrial infrastructures. Energy grids rely on the precise timing provided by Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), global logistics depends continuously on satellite data for tracking and coordination, and financial markets synchronize millions of transactions every day through signals transmitted from space. These functions are complemented by air and maritime traffic management, telecommunications, climate monitoring, emergency response, and the security of global supply chains. Taken together, they demonstrate that space infrastructures have evolved beyond a supporting technology to become the foundational layer upon which virtually every critical function of contemporary society now depends. As a consequence, safeguarding orbital infrastructures can no longer be regarded as a purely technological challenge. It has become a cross-cutting priority of national security, as state resilience is becoming increasingly inseparable from the resilience of its orbital infrastructure.

Conclusions

The investigation into Sino-Russian cooperation therefore tells a story that extends far beyond an alleged plan to counter Starlink. It reflects the gradual redefinition of the very concept of power. If Alfred Thayer Mahan identified maritime dominance as the foundation of global power, and Halford Mackinder regarded control of the Eurasian heartland as the key to geopolitical equilibrium, the twenty-first century may well come to be defined by a new strategic dimension: Space Power. Outer space is no longer merely a fifth operational domain. It has become the enabling domain that underpins and integrates the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and cyberspace, while increasingly providing the foundation upon which emerging capabilities—most notably artificial intelligence and quantum technologies—will depend. The space race has not ended; its objective has simply changed. Competition is no longer centred solely on reaching new celestial bodies or achieving technological milestones. Instead, it increasingly revolves around the ability to develop the most resilient, autonomous, and secure orbital ecosystem—one capable of sustaining national security, economic competitiveness, and digital sovereignty. If the twentieth century was the century of Sea Power, the twenty-first may well be remembered as the century of Space Power. Yet the implications of this transition extend beyond the emergence of a new operational domain. They point to a broader transformation in the foundations of geopolitical influence itself. As states become progressively more dependent on orbital infrastructures, strategic competition will increasingly concern not only access to space, but also the ability to build, protect, and govern the systems that sustain political authority, economic activity, and military effectiveness on Earth. In this emerging strategic environment, the decisive measure of both power and deterrence will lie not in the control of territory alone, but increasingly in the capacity to build, protect, and govern the orbital infrastructures upon which terrestrial power itself now depends.